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result is a complete characterization of the limit set, as the time horizon increases, of
the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely
repeated game. The same method can be used to fully characterize the limit set of the
set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of any the finitely repeated game.
Keywords: Finitely Repeated Games, Pure Strategy, Subgame Perfect Nash Equilib-
rium, Limit Perfect Folk Theorem, Discount Factor.
JEL classification: C72, C73.
1 Introduction
This paper provides a full characterization of the limit set, as the time horizon increases,
of the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of any finitely
repeated game. The obtained characterization is in terms of appropriate notions of fea-
sible and individually rational payoff vectors of the stage-game. These notions are based
on Smith’s (1995) notion of Nash decomposition and appropriately generalize the classic
notion of feasible payoff vectors as well as the notion of effective minimax payoff defined
by Wen (1994). The main theorem nests earlier results of Benoit and Krishna (1984)
and Smith (1995). Using a similar method, I obtain a full characterization of the limit
set, as the time horizon increases, of the set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium payoff
vectors of any finitely repeated game. The obtained result nests earlier results of Benoit
and Krishna (1987).
Whether non-Nash outcomes of the stage-game can be sustained by means of sub-
game perfect Nash equilibria of the finitely repeated game depends on whether players
1Ghislain H. DEMEZE-JOUATSA acknowledges DAAD for funding this research project and thanks
Christoph Kuzmics, Frank Riedel, Lones Smith, Michael Greinecker, Karl Schlag and Olivier Gossner
for useful comments.
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can be incentivized to abandon their short term interests and to follow some collusive
paths that have greater long-run average payoffs. There are two extreme cases. On the
one hand, in any finite repetition of a stage-game that has a unique Nash equilibrium
payoff vector such as the prisoners’ dilemma, only the stage-game Nash equilibrium pay-
off vector is sustainable by subgame perfect Nash equilibria of finite repetitions of that
stage-game. The underlying reason is that in the last round of the finitely repeated game,
players can agree only on Nash equilibria of the stage-game as no future retaliation is
possible. Backwardly, the same argument works at each round of the finitely repeated
game since each player has a unique continuation payoff for the upcoming rounds. On
the other hand, for stage-games in which all players receive different Nash equilibrium
payoffs as the battle of sexes, the limit perfect folk theorem hold: Any feasible and indi-
vidually rational payoff vector of the stage-game is achievable as the limit payoff vector
of a sequence of subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the finitely repeated game as the
time horizon goes to infinity.
Benoit and Krishna (1984) established that for the limit perfect folk theorem to hold,
it is sufficient that the dimension of the set of feasible payoff vectors of the stage-game
equals the number of players and that each player receives distinct payoffs at Nash
equilibria of the stage-game.2 Smith (1995) provided a weaker, necessary and sufficient
condition for the limit perfect folk theorem to hold. Smith (1995) showed that it is
necessary and sufficient that the Nash decomposition of the stage-game is complete; as
I explain below. The distinct Nash payoffs condition and the full dimensionality of the
set of feasible payoff vectors as in Benoit and Krishna (1984) or the complete Nash de-
composition of Smith (1995) allow us to construct credible punishment schemes and to
(recursively) leverage the behavior of any player near the end of the game. These are
essential to generate a limit perfect folk theorem. In the case that the stage-game admits
a unique Nash equilibrium payoff vector, Benoit and Krishna (1984) demonstrated that
the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game
is reduced to the unique stage-game Nash equilibrium payoff vector.
A part of the puzzle remains unresolved. Namely, for a stage-game that does not
admit a complete Nash decomposition, what is the exact range of payoff vectors that are
achievable as the limit payoff vector of a sequence of subgame perfect Nash equilibria of
finite repetitions of that stage-game?
2Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) introduced the notion of full dimensionality of the set of feasible
payoff vectors and used it to provide a sufficient condition for the perfect folk theorem for infinitely
repeated games.
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The Nash decomposition of a normal form game is a strictly increasing sequence of
non-empty groups of players. Players of the first group are those who receive at least two
distinct Nash equilibrium payoffs in the stage-game. The second group of players of the
Nash decomposition, if any, contains each player of the first group as well as some new
players. New players are those who receive at least two distinct Nash equilibrium payoffs
in the new game that is obtained from the stage-game by setting the utility function of
each player of the first group equal to a constant. This idea can be iterated. After a
finite number of iterations, the player set no longer changes. The Nash decomposition is
complete if its last element equals the whole set of players.
If the stage-game has an incomplete Nash decomposition, then the set of players
naturally breaks up into tow blocks where the first block contains all the players whose
behavior can recursively be leveraged near the end of the finitely repeated game. In con-
trast, it is not possible to control short run incentives of players of the second block of
the latter partition. Therefore, each player of the second block has to play a stage-game
pure best response at any profile that occurs on a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium play path. Stage-game action profiles eligible for pure strategy subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium play paths of the finitely repeated game are therefore exactly the
stage-game pure Nash equilibria of what one could call the effective one shot game, the
game obtained from the initial stage-game by setting the utility function of each player
of the first block equal to a constant.
This restriction of the set of eligible actions for pure strategy subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium play paths has two main implications. Firstly, for a feasible payoff vector to
be approachable by pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the finitely repeated
game, it has to be in the convex hull of the set of Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the
effective one shot game. I introduce the concept of a recursively feasible payoff vector. I
call a payoff vector recursively feasible if it belongs to the convex hull of the set of pay-
off vectors to profile of actions that are Nash equilibria of the effective one shot game.
Secondly, as subgame perfect Nash equilibria are protected against unilateral deviations
even off equilibrium paths, any player of the second block has to be at her best response
at any action profile occurring on a credible punishment path. Therefore, only pure Nash
equilibria of the effective one shot game are eligible for credible punishment paths in any
finite repetition of the original stage-game. Consequently, a player of the first block can
guarantee herself a payoff that is strictly greater than her effective minimax payoff. I
call this payoff the recursive effective minimax payoff.
The main finding of this paper says that, as the time horizon increases, the set of
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payoff vectors of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the finitely repeated
game converges to the set of recursively feasible payoff vectors that dominate the recur-
sive effective minimax payoff vector.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 I introduce the model and the definitions.
Section 3 states the main finding of the paper and sketches the proof. In Section 4, I
discuss some extensions and Section 5 concludes the paper. Proofs are provided in the
Appendices.
2 Model and definitions
2.1 The Stage-game
Let G = (N,A = ×i∈NAi, u = (ui)i∈N) be a stage-game where the set of players
N = {1, ..., n} is finite and where for all player i ∈ N the set Ai of actions of player i is
compact. Given player i ∈ N and an action profile a = (a1, ..., an) ∈ A, let ui(a) denote
the stage-game utility of player i given the action profile a. Given an action profile
a ∈ A, i ∈ N a player, and a′i ∈ Ai an action of player i, let (a′i, a−i) denote the action
profile in which all players except player i choose the same action as in a, while player
i chooses a′i. A stage-game pure best response of player i to the action profile a is an
action bi(a) ∈ Ai that maximizes the stage-game payoff of player i given that the choice
of other players is given by a−i. An action profile a ∈ A is a pure Nash equilibrium
of the stage-game G (denoted by a ∈ Nash(G)) if ui(a′i, a−i) ≤ ui(a) for all player
i ∈ N and all action a′i ∈ Ai.
Let γ be a real number that is strictly greater than any payoff a player might receive
in the stage-game G.3 A player is said to have to have distinct pure Nash payoffs in the
stage-game if there exist two pure Nash equilibria of the stage-game in which this player
receives different payoffs. Let τ(G) = (N,A, (u′i)i∈N) be the normal form game where
the utility function of player i is defined by
u′i =
{
γ if i has distinct Nash payoffs in G
ui otherwise
.
Let G0 := G and Gl+1 := τ(Gl) for all l ≥ 0. For all l ≥ 0, let Nl be the set of players
with a utility function that is constant to γ in the game Gl. As N is finite, there is an
h ∈ [0,+∞) such that Nl+1 = Nl for all l ≥ h. Let A˜ = Nash(Gh) be the set of pure
Nash equilibria of the game Gh.
3As the set A of action profiles is compact and the utility function u is continuous on A, the set
u(A) = {u(a) | a ∈ A} is compact and therefore bounded. This guarantee the existence of γ.
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Definition 1 The set of recursively feasible payoff vectors of the game G is defined
as the convex hull Conv[u(A˜)] of the set u(A˜) = {u(a) | a ∈ A˜}.
Let ∼ be the equivalence relation defined on the set of players as follows: Player i is
equivalent to j (denoted by i ∼ j) if there exists αij > 0 and βij ∈ R such that for all
a ∈ A˜, we have ui(a) = αij · uj(a) + βij. For all i ∈ N , let J (i) be the equivalence class
of player i and let
µ˜i = mina∈A˜ maxj∈J (i) maxa′j∈Aj
[
αij · uj(a′j, a−j) + βij
]
and µ˜ = (µ˜1, · · · , µ˜n).
If the stage-game G does not have any pure Nash equilibrium, then the set of pure
strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game
is empty. If the stage-game G admits at least one pure Nash equilibrium, then A˜ is
non-empty and µ˜ is well defined.
Definition 2 The payoff µ˜i is the recursive effective minimax of player i in the
stage-game G.
Call a payoff vector recursively individually rational if it dominates the recursive effective
minimax payoff vector µ˜. Let I˜ = {x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ R | xi ≥ µ˜i for all i ∈ N} be the
set of recursively individually rational payoff vectors.
2.2 The Finitely Repeated Game
Let G be the stage-game. Given T > 0, let G(T ) denote the T−repeated game
obtained by repeating the stage-game T times. A pure strategy of player i in the re-
peated game G(T ) is a contingent plan that provides for each history the action chosen
by player i given this history. That is, a strategy is a map σi :
⋃T
t=1A
t−1 → Ai where
A0 contains only the empty history. The strategy profile σ = (σ1, ..., σn) of G(T ) gener-
ates a play path pi(σ) = [pi1(σ), ..., piT (σ)] ∈ AT and player i ∈ N receives a sequence
(ui(pit(σ))1≤t≤T of payoffs. The preferences of player i ∈ N among strategy profiles are
represented by the average utility uTi (σ) =
1
T
∑T
t=1 ui[pit(σ)].
A strategy profile σ = (σ1, ..., σn) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of G(T )
if uTi (σ
′
i, σ−i) ≤ uTi (σ) for all i ∈ N and for all pure strategies σ′i of player i.
A strategy profile σ = (σ1, ..., σn) is a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium of G(T ) if given any t ∈ {1, ..., T} and any history ht ∈ At−1, the restriction
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σ|ht of σ to the history ht is a Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated game G(T−t+1).
Let d be the Euclidean distance of Rn, A and B be two closed and bounded non-
empty subsets of the metric space (Rn, d).4 The Hausdorff distance (based on d) between
A and B is given by
dH(A,B) = max
{
supx∈A d(x,B), supy∈B d(y, A)
}
,
where d(x, Y ) = infy∈Y d(x, y).
For any T > 0, let E(T ) be the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff
vectors of G(T ). Let E be such that the Hausdorff distance between E(T ) and E goes
to 0 as T goes to infinity. The set E is the Hausdorff limit of the set of subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game. As I show later in the
Appendix 1, the limit set E exists and is unique.
3 Main result
Theorem 1 Let G be a normal form stage-game with a finite number of players and a
compact set of action profiles. As the time horizon increases, the set of pure strategy
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game converges
(in the Hausdorff sense) to the set of recursively feasible and recursively individually
rational payoff vectors.
The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in the Appendix 1. It consists of four steps that I
describe below.
First step. Using the Hausdorff distance, I show that the limiting set E is well
defined. This means that, as the time horizon increases, the set of subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game converges. The main ingredient
of this proof is the conjunction lemma borrowed from Benoit and Krishna (1984); see
Lemma 2. The conjunction lemma says that, if pi and pi are, respectively, subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium play paths of G(T ) and G(T ), then the conjunction (pi, pi) is a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium play path of G(T + T ).
Second step. I prove by induction on the time horizon that on every pure strategy
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium play path of a finite repetition of the stage-game G,
only action profiles in A˜ are played. It follows that the set of pure strategy subgame
4The choice of the euclidean distance is without loss of generality as all distances derived from norms
are equivalent in finite dimension.
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perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game is included in the
set of recursively feasible payoff vectors, see Lemma 6 and Corollary 1.
Third step. I show that for all T > 0, any pure strategy subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium payoff vector of the finitely repeated game G(T ) dominates the recursive
effective minimax payoff vector. This means that in any pure strategy subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated game G(T ), each player receives at least her
recursive effective minimax payoff, see Lemma 7.
Fourth step. Given t > 0 and a recursively feasible payoff vector y that dominates
the recursive effective minimax payoff vector, I construct a subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium payoff vector yt of the finitely repeated game G(t) such that the sequence (yt)t≥1
converges to y. The family of equilibrium strategies that I use to sustain a target play
path is similar to those used by Smith (1995), Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), Abreu et al.
(1994) and Gossner (1995). The challenge here is to independently motivate each player
of the block Nh to be an effective punisher during a punishment phase. Indeed, as some
players of the block Nh might have equivalent utility functions, the payoff asymmetry
lemma of Abreu et al. (1994) does not generate a suitable reward payoff family. To over-
come this difficulty, I make use of a more powerful lemma, Lemma 9, which guarantees
the existence of a multi-level reward path function. The following five phases briefly
describe the above later family of strategy profiles.
The first phase (Phase P0) of the considered strategy consists to repeatedly follow a
target play path piy that has an average payoff equal to y. The second phase [Phase P(i)]
is a punishment phase and prescribes a way to punish a player, say i, if she belongs to the
block Nh and is the only one who deviated from the first phase. During this phase, each
player of the block Nh\J (i) can play whatever pure action she wants while players of
the block J (i)∪ (N\Nh) are required to play according to a profile m˜i.5 The third phase
serves as a compensation for players of the equivalence class J (i). Indeed, those players
might receive strictly less than their recursive effective minimax payoff in each period
of the phase P(i). The fourth phase is a transition. During the fifth phase, players of
the block Nh are rewarded. The reward level of each player depends on whether she was
effective punisher during the last punishment phase or not. It turns out that an utility
maximizing player will find it strictly dominant to be an effective punisher during the
phase P(i).
5At the profile of actions m˜i, player i does not have to be at a pure best response. If she plays a
pure best response to m˜i, she receives at least her stage-game pure minimax payoff but no more than
her stage-game recursive effective minimax payoff.
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4 Discussion and extension
4.1 Case of the Nash solution
Theorem 1 provides a complete characterization of the limit set of the set of pure strat-
egy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game. In
this section, I provide similar result for the set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium payoff
vectors of the finitely repeated game.
I find convenient to introduce few notations.
Let G = (N,A = ×i∈NAi, u = (ui)i∈N) be a compact normal form game. For all
player i, let µi = mina∈Amaxai∈Aiui(ai, a−i) be the minimax payoff of player i and
µ = (µ1, ..., µn) be the minimax payoff vector of the game G.
Let τ ∗(G) = (N,A, (u∗i )i∈N) be the normal form game where the utility function u
∗
i
of player i ∈ N is the same as in the original game G, unless the original game G has
a pure Nash equilibrium in which player i has a payoff that is strictly greater than her
minimax payoff µi. In that case, her utility function u
∗
i equals the constant γ.
Let G∗0 := G and G∗l+1 := τ ∗(G∗l) for all l ≥ 0. For all l ≥ 0, let N∗l be the set
of players with a utility function that is constant to γ in the game G∗l. As N is finite,
there is an h ∈ [0,+∞) such that N∗l+1 = N∗l for all l ≥ h. Let A∗ = Nash(G∗h) be the
set of pure Nash equilibria of the game G∗h.
Definition 3 The set of Nash-feasible payoff vectors of the game G is defined as
the convex hull Conv[u(A∗)] of the set u(A∗) = {u(a) | a ∈ A∗}.
Recall that a payoff vector is called individually rational if it dominates the minimax
payoff vector of the stage-game.
Theorem 2 Let G be a normal form stage-game with a finite number of players and a
compact set of action profiles. As the time horizon increases, the set of pure strategy
Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game converges (in the Hausdorff
sense) to the set of Nash-feasible and individually rational payoff vectors.
The proof of Theorem 2 is provided in Appendix 2.
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4.2 Alternative statement of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 respectively provide the limit set of the set of pure strategy
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of any finitely repeated game and the
limit set of the set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of any finitely re-
peated game. Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 can equivalently be stated as necessary and
sufficient conditions on a feasible payoff vector of any given stage-game to be approach-
able by equilibrium strategies of finite repetitions of that stage-game.
Recall that a payoff vector is called feasible if it belongs to the convex hull of the set
of stage-game payoff vectors u(A) = {u(a) | a ∈ A}.
Definition 4 A feasible payoff vector x is approachable by means of pure strategy sub-
game perfect Nash equilibria of the finitely repeated game if for all ε > 0 there exists an
integer Tε such that for all T > Tε, the finitely repeated game G(T ) has a pure strategy
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium whose average payoff vector is within ε of x.
Definition 5 A feasible payoff vector x is approachable by means of pure strategy Nash
equilibria of the finitely repeated game if for all ε > 0 there exists an integer Tε such
that for all T > Tε, the finitely repeated game G(T ) has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
whose average payoff vector is within ε of x.
Theorem 3 Let G be a normal form stage-game with a finite number of players and a
compact set of action profiles. Let x be a feasible payoff vector. The following statements
are equivalent.
1 The payoff vector x is recursively feasible and recursively individually rational.
2 The payoff vector x is approachable by means of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash
equilibria of the finitely repeated game.
Theorem 4 Let G be a normal form stage-game with a finite number of players and a
compact set of action profiles. Let x be a feasible payoff vector. The following statements
are equivalent.
1 The payoff vector x is Nash-feasible and individually rational.
2 The payoff vector x is approachable by means of pure strategy Nash equilibria of the
finitely repeated game.
The equivalence of Theorem 1 (respectively Theorem 2) and Theorem 3 (respectively
Theorem 4) follow from Lemma 5 (respectively Lemma 13).
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4.3 Case with discounting
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 assume no discounting. This assumption is without loss
of generality. The underlying reason is that a payoff continuation lemma for finitely
repeated game with discounting holds. This lemma allows to approach any feasible
payoff vector by means of deterministic paths in the case that there exists a discount
factor. I show in the Appendix 3 how to make use this payoff continuation lemma to
prove the effective folk theorem for finitely repeated games with discounting.
Lemma 1 (Payoff continuation lemma for finitely repeated game) For any ε >
0, there exists k > 0 and δ < 1 such that for any feasible payoff vector x, there exists a
deterministic sequence of profile of stage-game actions {aτ}kτ=1 whose discounted average
payoff is within ε of x for all discount factor δ ≥ δ.
This lemma establishes that for any positive ε, there exists an uniform k > 0 and δ such
that any feasible payoff is within ε of the discounted average of a deterministic path of
length k for any discount factor greater than or equal to δ.
4.4 Relation with the literature
Finitely repeated games with complete information and perfect monitoring has exten-
sively been studied. This paper provides a generalization of earlier results by Benoit and
Krishna (1984), Benoit and Krishna (1987), Smith (1995) and Gonza´lez-Dı´az (2006).
The sequence of subset (Nl)l≥0 defined in Section 2.1 induces a Nash decomposition
0  N1  · · ·  Nh. The Nash decomposition is called complete if Nh = N . Smith
(1995) proved that having a complete Nash decomposition is a necessary and sufficient
condition for the limit perfect folk theorem to hold. Under a complete Nash decomposi-
tion, the set of recursively feasible payoff vectors equals the classic set of feasible payoff
vectors and the recursive effective minimax payoff vector equals the classic effective min-
imax payoff vector. In that case, Theorem 3 says that any feasible payoff vector that
dominates the effective minimax payoff vector is approachable by means of pure strategy
subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the finitely repeated game. That is the message of
the limit perfect folk theorem.
Benoit and Krishna (1984) showed that, if the dimension of the set of feasible payoff
vectors of the stage-game equals the number of players and each player receives at least
two distinct payoffs at pure Nash equilibria of the stage-game, then the limit perfect folk
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theorem holds. This result is a particular case of Theorem 3. Indeed, under the distinct
stage-game Nash equilibrium payoffs condition of Benoit and Krishna (1984), the Nash
decomposition of the stage-game equals ∅  Nh = N which is complete and therefore
the set of the recursively feasible payoff vectors equals the classic set of the feasible payoff
vectors and the recursive effective minimax payoff vector equals the classic effective min-
imax payoff vector. Furthermore, under the full dimensionality condition, the effective
minimax payoff vector equals the minimax payoff vector.
Benoit and Krishna (1987) provided a sufficient condition under which any feasible
and individually rational payoff vector can be approximated by the average payoff in a
Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated game. The authors showed that it is sufficient
that any player receives in at least one stage-game Nash equilibrium a payoff that is
strictly greater than her minimax payoff vector. Basically, under this condition, the de-
composition ∅  N∗1 = N is complete and the set of Nash-feasible payoff vectors equals
the set of feasible payoff vector. In such a case, Theorem 4 says that any feasible and
individually rational payoff vector of the stage-game can be approached by means of pure
strategy Nash equilibria of the finitely repeated game.
Gonza´lez-Dı´az (2006) studied the set of Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of a finitely
repeated game. His analysis however, differs from that of Section 4.1 of this paper .
Indeed, Gonza´lez-Dı´az (2006) restricted attention to a particular set of payoff vectors
–the set of payoff vectors that belong to the convex hull of the set of payoff vectors
to profile of pure actions of the stage-game that dominate the pure minimax payoff
vector of the stage-game–. This restriction is not without loss of generality, since the
set of Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game might converge to
a higher-dimension upper set. Theorem 2 and Theorem 4 of this paper provide a full
characterization of the whole limit set of the set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium payoffs
of the finitely repeated game.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzed the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
payoff vectors of the finitely repeated games with complete information. The main
finding is an effective folk theorem. It is a complete characterization of the limit set, as
the time horizon increases, of the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game. As the time horizon increases, the limiting
set always exists, is closed, convex and can be strictly in between the convex hull of
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the set of stage-game Nash equilibrium payoff vectors and the classic set of feasible and
individually rational payoff vectors. Our finding exhibits the exact range of cooperative
payoffs that players can achieve in finite time horizon. One might wonder if similar
results holds in the case that players can employ unobservable mixed strategies or in the
case that equilibrium strategies are are protected against renegotiation.
6 Appendix 1: Proof of the Complete perfect folk
theorem
6.1 On the existence of the limit set of the set of pure strat-
egy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the
finitely repeated game
In this section, I show that the limit set of the set of pure strategy subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of any finitely repeated game is well defined. Precisely,
I prove that for any stage-game, the set of feasible payoff vectors that are approachable
by means of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the finitely repeated game
equals the limit set E. As corollary, I obtain that the limit set E is a compact and convex
subset of the set of feasible payoff vectors of the stage-game. The main ingredient of
this proof is the conjunction lemma established by Benoit and Krishna (1984) . The
conjunction lemma says that the conjunction of two subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
play paths is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium play path of the corresponding finitely
repeated game. I state it below. Note that the convexity and the compactness of E
considerably simplify the proof of Theorems 1 and 3.
Lemma 2 (See Benoit and Krishna (1984) ) If pi and pi are two subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium play paths of G(T ) and G(T ) respectively, then the conjunction (pi, pi) is a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium play path of G(T + T ).
Let G be a compact normal form game and let ASPNE(G) be the set of all feasible
payoff vectors of the stage-game G that are approachable by means of pure strategy sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game (see Definition
4).
Lemma 3 The set ASPNE(G) is compact and convex.
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Proof of Lemma 3.
The reader can check that ASPNE(G) is a closed subset of the set of feasible payoff
vectors which is compact. The set ASPNE(G) is therefore compact. Since ASPNE(G)
is closed, its convexity holds if z = 1
2
(x+ y) ∈ ASPNE(G) for all x, y ∈ ASPNE(G). Let
x, y ∈ ASPNE(G) and let ε > 0. Choose T x0 and T y0 from the Definition 4 such that for
all T > max{T x0 , T y0 }, the finitely repeated game G(T ) has two pure strategy subgame
perfect Nash equilibria σx and σy such that d(x, uT (σx)) < ε
5
and d(y, uT (σy)) < ε
5
. Let
T > max{T x0 , T y0 }, σx and σy be two pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of
the game G(T ) such that d(x, uT (σx)) < ε
5
and d(y, uT (σy)) < ε
5
. Let pi = (pi(σx), pi(σy))
be the conjunction of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium play paths pi(σx) and pi(σy)
generated by the strategies σx and σy respectively. Let a ∈ Nash(G) be a pure Nash
equilibrium of the stage-game G and pi′ = (a, pi(σx), pi(σy)) be the conjunction of the
pure Nash equilibrium a and the play path pi. From Lemma 2, pi and pi′ are respectively
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium play paths of G(2T ) and G(2t + 1). In addition,
d(z, u2T (pi)) < 4ε
5
and
d(z, u2T+1(pi′)) < d(z, u2T (pi)) + d(u2T (pi), u2T+1(pi′)) <
4ε
5
+
2ρ
2T + 1
where ρ = 2 maxa∈A ‖u(a)‖∞. Consequently, for all T > 2 max{T x0 , T y0 , 10ρε }, the finitely
repeated gameG(T ) has a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium whose average
payoff is within ε of z. That is z ∈ ASPNE(G).
Lemma 4 For all T > 0, E(T ) ⊆ ASPNE(G).
Proof of Lemma 4.
Let σ be a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated game
G(T ) and pi(σ) = (pi1(σ), · · · , piT (σ)) be the play path generated by σ. Let x = uT (σ).
For all s ≥ 0 and t ∈ {2, · · · , T}, let
pi(s, t) = (pit(σ), · · · , piT (σ), pi(σ), · · · , pi(σ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
s times
)
be a play path of G((s+ 1)T − t+ 1). From Lemma 2, pi(s, l) is a pure strategy subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium play path of the finitely repeated game G((s + 1)T − t + 1).
Moreover, the sequence of payoff vectors
(
u(s+1)T−t+1[pi(s, l)]
)
s≥0 converges to x.
Lemma 5 As the time horizon increases, the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game converges to the set ASPNE(G).6
6The convergence in this lemma uses the Hausdorff distance. See Section 2.2.
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Proof of Lemma 5. Let ε > 0. We search for Tε > 0 such that for all T > Tε,
dH(ASPNE(G), E(T )) < ε. Let {B(xl, ε2) | xl ∈ P, l = 1, ..., L} be a finite covering of
ASPNE(G).7 For all l = 1, ..., L take T l0 given by the definition of “x
l ∈ ASPNE(G)” with
ε
2
.8 Pose T0 = maxl≤L T l0. Let T > T0 and let x ∈ ASPNE(G). Let xl0 ∈ ASPNE(G)
be such that x ∈ B(xl0 , ε
2
) and let y ∈ E(T ) be such that d(xl0 , y) < ε
2
. We have
d(x, y) ≤ d(x, xl0) + d(xl0 , y) < ε. This implies that d(x,E(T )) < ε. Consequently,
supx∈ASNPE(G) d(x,E(T )) ≤ ε. Furthermore, from Lemma 4, d(y,ASPNE(G)) = 0 for all
y ∈ E(T ). That is supy∈E(T ) d(y,ASPNE(G)) = 0. It follows that dH(ASPNE(G), E(T ))
= supx∈P d(x,E(T )) ≤ ε for all T > T0. Take Tε = T0.
6.2 The recursive feasibility of pure strategy subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated
game
Lemma 6 Let G be a compact normal form game, let T > 0, and let σ be a pure strategy
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of G(T ). The support Supp(pi(σ)) = {pi1(σ) . . . piT (σ)}
of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium play path pi(σ) = (pi1(σ) . . . piT (σ)) is included in
the set Nash(Gh) of pure Nash equilibrium profiles of the effective game Gh.
Proof of Lemma 6.
If Nh = N, then Nash(G
h) = A and Supp(pi(σ)) ⊆ Nash(Gh). Now assume that
N\Nh 6= ∅. Let’s proceed by induction on the time horizon T .
For T = 1, the pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium σ is a pure Nash equi-
librium of the stage-game G. By construction, the sequence (Nash(Gl))l≥0 is increasing
and therefore Nash(G) = Nash(G0) ⊆ Nash(Gh).
Suppose that T > 1 and that the support of any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium play
path of the finitely repeated game G(t) with t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} is included in the set
Nash(Gh) and let’s show that {pi1(σ), . . . , piT (σ)} ⊆ Nash(Gh). The restriction σ|pi1(σ) of
σ to the history pi1(σ) is a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game
G(T − 1) and the induction hypothesis implies that the support {pi2(σ) . . . piT (σ)} of the
play path pi(σ|pi1(σ) ) generated by the strategy profile σ|pi1(σ) is included in Nash(G
h). It
remains to show that pi1(σ) ∈ Nash(Gh).
At this point I proceed by contradiction. Assume that pi1(σ) /∈ Nash(Gh). Then, in the
game Gh, there exists a player i ∈ N who has a strict incentive to deviate from the
pure action profile pi1(σ). This player has to be in the block N\Nh since any player of
the block Nh has a constant utility function in the game G
h. Let σ′i be a pure strategy
7B(x, ε) = {y ∈ Rn / d(x, y) < ε}
8See Definition 4.
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one shot deviation of player i from σ that consists in playing a stage-game pure best
response bi[pi1(σ)] to pi1(σ) in the first round of the finitely repeated game G(T ) and
conforming to σi from the second round on. At the pure strategy profile (σ
′
i, σ−i), player
i receives ui(pi
1) + e (with e > 0) in the first round. Let h1 = (bi(pi1(σ)), pi1(σ)−i) be the
observed history after this first round and σ|h1 be the restriction of σ to the history h1.
We have (σ′i, σ−i)|h1 = σ|h1 and σ|h1 is a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
of G(T − 1). By induction hypothesis, the support of the play path generated by σ|h1 is
included in Nash(Gh). Therefore, at the profile (σ′i, σ−i) player i receives the sequence of
stage-game payoffs {ui(pi1) + e, ni, . . . , ni} where ni is her unique stage-game pure Nash
equilibrium payoff.9 Since player i receives {ui(pi1(σ)), ni, ...ni} at the strategy profile σ,
we have uTi (σ
′
i, σ−i) > u
T
i (σ). This contradicts the fact that σ is a pure strategy subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of G(T ) and concludes the proof.
Let F˜ be the set of recursively feasible payoff vectors. We have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Let G be a compact normal form game, let T > 0, and let σ be a pure
strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of G(T ). Then the average payoff vector uT (σ)
belongs to the set F˜ .
6.3 Necessity of the recursive effective minimax payoff for the
complete perfect folk theorem
Wen (1994) shows that any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vector of the
infinitely repeated game weakly dominates the effective minimax payoff vector. This
domination also holds for finitely repeated games. The following lemma provides a
sharp upper bound. The lemma says that, any pure strategy subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium payoff vector of the finitely repeated game weakly dominates the recursive
effective minimax payoff vector.
Lemma 7 Let G be a compact normal form game, let T ≥ 1, and let σ be a pure
strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated game G(T ). Then the
average payoff vector uT (σ) dominates the recursive effective minimax payoff vector of
the stage-game.
I find convenient to recall the definition of the recursive effective minimax payoff
before proceeding to the proof of Lemma 7.
9Recall that each player of the block N\Nh has a unique pure Nash equilibrium payoff in the game
Gh. This payoff equals her unique pure Nash equilibrium payoff in the original game G.
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Let ∼ be the equivalence relation defined on the set of players as follows: Player i is
equivalent to j (denoted by i ∼ j) if there exists αij > 0 and βij ∈ R such that for all
a ∈ A˜, we have ui(a) = αij · uj(a) + βij. For all i ∈ N , let J (i) be the equivalence class
of player i and let
µ˜i = mina∈A˜ maxj∈J (i) maxa′j∈Aj
[
αij · uj(a′j, a−j) + βij
]
and µ˜ = (µ˜1, . . . , µ˜n). The payoff µ˜i is the recursive effective minimax of player
i in the stage-game G and the n-tuple µ˜ is the recursive effective minimax payoff
vector of the stage-game G.
Proof of Lemma 7.
I proceed by induction on the time horizon T .
At T = 1, pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the game G(T ) are pure
Nash equilibria of the stage-game G and uT (σ) dominates µ˜.10
Assume that T > 1 and that the average payoff vector to any pure strategy subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated game G(t) with 0 < t < T dominates
the recursive effective minimax payoff vector µ˜. Let us show that the payoff vector uT (σ)
dominates µ˜.
Let pi1(σ) be the action profile played in the first round of the game G(T ) according
to σ. The restriction σ|pi1(σ) of the strategy σ to the history pi1(σ) is a pure strategy
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated gameG(T−1) and by induction
hypothesis, we have that the payoff vector uT−1(σ|pi1(σ) ) dominates µ˜. Suppose now that
uT (σ) does not dominates µ˜. Then there exists a player i ∈ N such that uTi (σ) < µ˜i.
It follows that ui[pi1(σ)] < µ˜i since u
T
i (σ) is a convex combination of ui[pi1(σ)] and
uT−1i (σ|pi1(σ) ). Moreover, as pi1(σ) ∈ Nash(Gh), we have uj[pi1(σ)] < µ˜j for all j ∈ J (i).
From the definition of µ˜, there exists a player i0 ∈ J (i) and a pure action ai0 ∈ Ai0 of
player i0 such that ui0 [ai0 , pi1(σ)−i0 ] ≥ µ˜i0 . Consider the pure strategy one shot deviation
σ′i0 of player i0 from σ in which she plays ai0 in the first round of the finitely repeated
game G(T ) and conforms to her strategy σi0 from the second round on. We have
uTi0(σ
′
i0
, σ−i0) =
1
T
ui0 [ai0 , pi1(σ)−i0 ] +
T−1
T
uT−1i0 (σ|(ai0 ,pi1(σ)−i0 ) )
which is greater than or equal to µ˜i0 . Indeed, since σ|(ai0 ,pi1(σ)−i0 ) is a pure strategy
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium play path of the finitely repeated game G(T − 1), the
induction hypothesis implies that u(σ|(ai0 ,pi1(σ)−i0 ) ) dominates µ˜.
10Indeed, as each pure Nash equilibrium of the stage-game G is a pure Nash equilibrium of the game
Gh and each player plays a best response in Nash equilibrium, the Nash equilibrium payoff of any
player is greater than or equal to her recursive effective minimax payoff. It follows that any pure Nash
equilibrium payoff vector weakly dominates the recursive effective minimax payoff vector.
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6.4 Sufficiency of the recursive feasibility and the recursive ef-
fective individual rationality
From Corollary 1 and Lemma 7, the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium payoff vectors of any finite repetition of the stage-game G is included in the set of
recursively feasible and recursively individually rational payoff vectors. To complete the
proofs of Theorem 1, it is left to show that any recursively feasible and recursively indi-
vidually rational payoff vector belongs to the limit set E. In what follows, I prove that
any recursively feasible and recursively individually rational payoff vector is approach-
able by means of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the finitely repeated
game. This will conclude the proof of Theorem 1 as well as the proof of Theorem 3,
see Lemma 5. I proceed with 3 lemmata. The message of the first lemma is that in the
finitely repeated game, players of the block Nh receive distinct payoffs at pure strategy
subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
The sequence of subsets (Nl)l≥0 defined in Section 2.1 induces a separation of the set
of players into two blocks Nh and N\Nh. As a corollary of Lemma 6, each player of
the block N\Nh (if any) receives her unique stage-game pure Nash equilibrium payoff at
each round of a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of any finite repetition
of the stage-game G. The underlying reason is that there is no way to credibly leverage
the behavior of any player of the latter block near the end of the game. The next lemma
says that each player of the block Nh receives distinct payoffs at pure strategy subgame
perfect Nash equilibria of the finitely repeated game. The construction of this lemma is
inspired by Smith (1995).
Let G be a compact normal form game that has at least two distinct pure Nash
equilibrium payoff vectors. Let
∅ = N0  N1  ...  Nh
be the Nash decomposition of G.
Lemma 8 There exists T0 such that for all T ≥ T0, each player of Nh receives at least
two distinct payoffs at pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the finitely repeated
game G(T ).
Proof of Lemma 8.
I prove that for all g ≤ h, there exists T0,g such that for all T ≥ T0,g, each player of the
block Ng receives distinct payoffs at pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of
G(T ). Obviously this property holds for g = 1 since each player of the block N1 receives
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distinct payoffs at pure Nash equilibria of the stage-game G. Let g ≥ 1 and assume that
the property holds for g. For all j ∈ Ng, let pij,g and pij,g be respectively the best and
the worst pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium play path of player j in the
game G(T0,g). Let ρ = 2 maxa∈A ‖u(a)‖∞ and ψ > 0 such that
−ρ+ ψ · T0,g ·
∑
j∈Ng u
T
i (pi
j,g) > ψ |Ng| · T0,g · uTi (pii,g)
for all i ∈ Ng. Each player j ∈ Ng is willing to conform to any pure action profile
followed by ψ cycles (pii,g)i∈Ng if deviations by player j are punished by switching each
pii,g to pij,g. Let i0 ∈ Ng+1\Ng and let yi0,g and zi0,g the best and respectively the worst
pure strategy Nash equilibrium of player i0 in the one shot game G
g. Player i0 receives
distinct payoffs at pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium play paths
pii0 =
yi0,g, (pii,g)i∈Ng , · · · , (pii,g)i∈Ng︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψtimes

and
pii0 =
zi0,g, (pii,g)i∈Ng , · · · , (pii,g)i∈Ng︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψtimes
.
This guarantee the existence of T0,g+1 such that each player of the block Ng+1\Ng re-
ceives distinct payoffs at pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of G(T0,g+1).
Repeatedly appending the same stage-game pure Nash equilibrium profile at each pii0
and pii0 , we obtain for each T ≥ T0,g+1 and i0 ∈ Ng+1\Ng two pure strategy subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium play paths of G(T ) at which player i0 receives distinct payoffs.
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
The next lemma establishes the existence of a multi-level reward path function. In
the case that the full dimensionality condition of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) or the
non-equivalent utility (NEU) condition of Abreu et al. (1994) does not hold, a multi-level
reward path function can still be used to independently control the incentives of players
of the block Nh and motivate them to be effective punishers during a punishment phase.
This lemma also allows to leverage the behavior of players of the block Nh near the end
of the game.
Lemma 9 Let ∅ = N0  N1  ...  Nh be the Nash decomposition of the game G. Then
there exists φ > 0 such that for all p ≥ 0 there exists rp > 0 and
θp : {0, 1}n ∪ {(−1, · · · ,−1)} → Arp := A× · · · × A
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such that for all α ∈ {0, 1}n ∪ {(−1, · · · ,−1)}, θp(α) is a play path generated by a pure
strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the repeated game G(rp). Furthermore, for
all i ∈ Nh and α, α′ ∈ {0, 1}n, we have
u
rp
i [θ
p(1, α−i)]− urpi [θp(0, α−i)] ≥ φ, (1)
u
rp
i [θ
p(α)]− urpi [θp(−1, · · · ,−1)] ≥ φ (2)
and
|urpi [θp(α)]− urpi [θp(αJ (i) , α′N\J (i))]| <
1
2p
. (3)
Proof of Lemma 9. The set ASPNE(G) of feasible payoff vectors that are approach-
able by means of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of finite repetitions of the
stage-game G is non-empty and convex and therefore has a relative interior point x, see
Lemma 3. Let φ > 0 such that the relative ball B˜(x, 5φn) is included in ASPNE(G).11
For all α ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n and j ∈ Nh, let
θj(α) = xj − φ|J (j)|+ 3φ
∑
j′∈J (j) α
′
j.
For all j /∈ Nh, let
θj(α) = xj.
I recall that if j /∈ Nh, then xj is the unique stage-game pure Nash equilibrium payoff of
player j. For all α ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n, let
θ(α) = (θ1(α), · · · , θn(α)).
For all α ∈ {0, 1}n and i ∈ Nh we have
θi(1, α−i)− θi(0, α−i) = 3φ;
θi(α)− θi(−1, · · · ,−1) ≥ 3φ
and
‖θ(α)− x‖ < 5nφ.
Furthermore, since players of the block Nh receive distinct payoffs at pure strategy sub-
game perfect Nash equilibria of the finitely repeated game (see Lemma 8), each of them
also receives distinct payoffs within the set ASPNE(G) (see Lemma 4). It follows that
11For simplicity and as ASPNE(G) is convex, one can take
B˜(y, 5φn) = {x ∈ ASPNE(G) | d(x, y) < 5φn}.
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θ(α) ∈ B˜(x, 5φn) ⊆ ASPNE(G).
For all p ≥ 0, let εp = 12 min{φ, 12p}. For all α ∈ {0, 1}n ∪ {(−1, · · · ,−1)}, let T0,α,p <∞
and for all T ≥ T0,α,p, let σα,p be a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of
the repeated game G(T ) such that ‖uT (σα,p)− θ(α)‖ < εp.
Let rp = max{T0,α,p | α ∈ {0, 1}n∪{(−1, · · · ,−1)}}. For all α ∈ {0, 1}n∪{(−1, · · · ,−1)},
let θp(α) be the pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium play path generated by
the pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium σα,p of the repeated game G(rp).
Lemma 10 Let G be a compact normal form game. We have F˜ ∩ I˜ ⊆ ASPNE(G).
Proof of Lemma 10.
Let G be a compact normal form game. If G admits no pure Nash equilibrium, then
F˜ = ∅ and F˜ ∩ I˜ ⊆ ASPNE(G). If G admits a unique pure Nash equilibrium payoff
vector x, then F˜ = {x} = ASPNE(G) and F˜ ∩ I˜ ⊆ ASPNE(G). Now suppose that G
admits at least two distinct pure Nash equilibrium payoff vectors. Normalize the game
such that the recursive effective minimax of each player equals 0 and such that two
equivalent players have the same utility function on A˜. Consider
F1 = {1p
∑
1≤l≤p u(a
l) | p > 0, al ∈ A˜ ∀l ≤ p}
and
I1 = {x ∈ Rn | xi > 0 if i ∈ Nh and xi = 0 otherwise}.
It is immediate that the closure of F1 ∩ I1 is equal to the set F˜ ∩ I˜. From Lemma 3,
ASPNE(G) is closed. Therefore, it is enough to show that F1 ∩ I1 ⊆ ASPNE(G). Let
y = 1
k
∑
1≤l≤k u(a
l) ∈ F1 ∩ I1
and
piy = (a1, ..., ak).
For all i ∈ Nh, let
m˜i ∈ argmina∈A˜ maxj∈J (i) maxa′i∈Ai ui(a′i, a−i).12
Obtain φ, r1 and θ
1 with p = 1 from the Lemma 9. Let q1 > 0 and q2 > 0 such that
0 < q1ui(m˜
i) + q2r1u
r1
i [θ
1(1, · · · , 1)] < q1 + q2r1
2
yi (4)
and
−2ρ+ q1
2
yi > 0 for all i ∈ Nh. (5)
12Few comments on m˜i are provided in footnote 5.
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Given q1, q2 and r1, choose r such that
−2(q1 + q2r1)ρ+ rφ > 0. (6)
Given q1 q2, r1 and r, choose p0 > 0 such that
q2r1
2
yi − r
2p0
> yi − r
2p0
> 0 (7)
Apply the Lemma 9 to p0 and obtain rp0 and θ
p0 . Update q1 ← rp0q1; q2 ← rp0q2r1; r ←
rp0r. The parameters φ, θ
1, q1, q2, r, r1 and θ
p0 are such that
0 < q1ui(m˜
i) + q2u
r1
i [θ
1(1, · · · , 1)] < q1 + q2
2
yi (8)
−2(q1 + q2)ρ+ rφ > 0 (9)
−2ρ+ q1 + q2
2
yi − r
2p0
> 0 (10)
and
yi − r
2p0
> 0 for all i ∈ Nh. (11)
Let
pis = (piy, ..., piy︸ ︷︷ ︸
s times
, θp0(1, · · · , 1)).
Assume that for all s ≥ 0 there exists σs a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium of the finitely repeated game G(sk+ r) such that the play path pi(σs) generated
by σs equals pis. Since the limit of usk+r(pis) as s goes to infinity equals the payoff vector
y and k is finite, there exists sε > 0 such that for all T > sεk + r, the finitely repeated
game G(T ) has a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium whose average payoff
vector is within ε of y. This will conclude the proof of Lemma 10.
Let s ≥ 0. Let us construct a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium σs
of the finitely repeated game G(sk + r) such that the play path pi(σs) generated by σs
equals pis.
In the following, a deviation from a strategy profile of the finitely repeated game
G(sk + r) is called “late” if it occurs during the last q1 + q2 + r periods of the game
G(sk + r). In the other case the deviation is called “early”. Set α = (1, · · · , 1) and
consider the pure strategy profile σs described by the following 5 phases.
P0 (Main play path): In this phase, players are required to play the (sk + r − t + 1)th
to last profile of actions of the path pis at time t, 1 ≤ t ≤ sk + r.
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Ignore any deviation by a player i /∈ Nh

P(i) (Punish player i): Reorder the profile of actions in each upcoming cycle of length
k of the main play path according to player i′s preferences, starting from her best
profile.
During this phase, each player of the block J (i) ∪ (N\Nh) is required to play as
in the action profile m˜i while players of the block Nh\J (i) can play whatever pure
action they want. This phase last for q1 periods. [If any player j ∈ J (i) deviates
early, restart P(i) ; if player j ∈ J (i) deviates late, start LD; Ignore any deviation
by a player i /∈ Nh.]
At the end of this phase and for all j ∈ Nh\J (i), set αj = 0 if there is at least one
period of the punishment phase P(i) where player j played an action different to
m˜ij. In the other case, set αj = 1. Go to phase SPE.
SPE (Compensation): Follow q2
r1
times a pure strategy SPNE of the game G(r1) whose
play path is θ1(1, · · · , 1).
Go to Phase P0
LD (Late deviation): Each player can play whatever action she wants till period sk. At
period sk, set Set α = (−1, · · · ,−1). Go to EG.
EG (End-game): Follow r
rp0
times a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of
the finitely repeated game G(rp0) that supports the equilibrium play path θ
p0(α).
The strategy profile σs is a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the
finitely repeated game G(sk+r). To see this, I show that parameters φ, θ1, q1, q2, r, r1
and θp0 are chosen in such a way to deter any deviation from the main play path as well
as any deviation from the minimax phase.
I first show that a utility maximizing player j ∈ Nh\J (i) will find it strictly dominant
to be effective punisher during any punishment phase P(i).13 The underlying reason is
that for each player j ∈ Nh, the average utility urp0j (θp0(αj, α−j)) is strictly increasing in
αj. Indeed, if player j ∈ Nh\J (i) is effective punisher during the Phase P(i), she gets
at least
1. −(q1 + q2)ρ in the phases P(i) and SPE;
13I call player j ∈ Nh\J (i) effective punisher during the punishment phase P(i) if αj = 1 at the end
of the latter phase. After the punishment phase P(i), if α−J (i) = (1, . . . , 1), then the average payoff of
player i during the punishment phase P(i) is less than or equal to 0, independently of the value of αi.
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2. some payoff Uj till period sk;
3. ru
rp0
i [θ
p0(1, α−j)] in the last r periods of the repeated game G(sk + r).
That is in total −(q1 + q2)ρ+ Uj + rurp0i [θp0(1, α−j)]. If she is not effective punisher,
she get at most
1. (q1 + q2)ρ in the phases P(i) and SPE;
2. the same payoff Uj till period sk;
3. ru
rp0
i [θ
p0(0, α−j)] in the last r periods of the repeated game G(sk + r).
That is in total (q1 + q2)ρ + Uj + ru
rp0
i [θ
p0(0, α−j)] which is less than or equal to
(q1 + q2)ρ+Uj + ru
rp0
i [θ
p0(1, α−j)]− rφ, see inequality (1). Since −2(q1 + q2)ρ+ rφ > 0,
we have
−(q1 + q2)ρ+ Uj + rurp0i [θp0(1, α−j)] > (q1 + q2)ρ+ Uj + rurp0i [θp0(0, α−j)]
Thus, it is strictly dominant for any player of the block Nh\J (i) to be effective punisher
during the punishment phase P(i). No player of the block N\Nh will have any incentive
to deviate given that players of the block Nh\J (i) are effective punisher. Indeed, every
player of the block N\Nh plays a stage-game pure best response at each profile of actions
a ∈ A˜.14.
1) No early deviation from the phase P(i) is profitable
If after l1k + l2 (where l2 < k) periods in the Phase P(i) a player j ∈ J (i) deviates
unilaterally, the strategy profile σs prescribes to start a new punishment phase P(i)
followed by a SPE phase, to reorder the profiles of the target path, and to go back to
the Phase P0. Such deviation is not profitable. Indeed, if player j deviates early, she
receives at most:
1. 0 in the first l1k + l2 periods of the Phase P(i).
2. q1ui(m˜
i)+q2u
r1
i [θ
1(1, · · · , 1)] in the new phase P(i) and the following SPE phase;
3. some payoff Ui till period sk;
4. the payoff ru
rp0
i [θ
p0(α)] + r
2p0
in the End-game.
14In the finitely repeated game G(sk + r), after any history h, the strategy profile σs prescribes to
play the stage-game action profile σs(h) which belongs to A˜ = Nash(Gh), see Lemma 6. As every player
of the block N\Nh plays a stage-game pure best response in any profile a ∈ A˜, no player of the block
N\Nh can profitably deviate from the strategy profile σs.
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If player i does not deviate, she receives at least:
1. q1ui(m˜
i) + q2u
r1
i [θ
1(1, · · · , 1)] in the Phases P(i) and SPE;
2. l1kyi + l2yi till the end of the phase SPE ;
3. the same payoff Ui till period sk;
4. the payoff ru
rp0
i [θ
p0(α)] in the End-game.
As yi− r2p0 > 0 and l1kyi + l2yi ≥ 1, no early deviation from the phase P(i) is profitable.
2) No early deviation during phase P0 is profitable
If from the phase P0 a player let’s say i deviates early, then the strategy profile σ
s
prescribes to start phase P(i), to update α and to go to the phase SPE. Such a deviation
is not profitable. Indeed, if player i deviates early from the phase P0, she receives at
most
1. ρ in the deviation period;
2. q1ui(m˜
i) + q2u
r1
i [θ
1(1, · · · , 1)] in the phase P(i) and the following SPE phase;
3. some payoff Ui till the period sk;
4. the payoff ru
rp0
i [θ
p0(αJ (i) , 1, · · · , 1)] till the end of the game.
In total ρ + q1ui(m˜
i) + q2u
r1
i [θ
1(1, · · · , 1)] + Ui + rurp0i [θp0(αJ (i) , 1, · · · , 1)] which is
strictly less than ρ+ q1+q2
2
yi +Ui + ru
rp0
i [θ
p0(αJ (i) , 1, · · · , 1)], see inequality (8). If player
i does not deviates, she get at least
1. −ρ in that deviation period;
2. Followed by (q1 + q2)yi corresponding to the phases P(i) and SPE;
15
3. the same payoff Ui till period sk;
4. the payoff ru
rp0
i [θ
p0(α)] in the phase EG.
That is in total −ρ+ (q1 + q2)yi +Ui + rurp0i [θp0(α)] which is greater than −ρ+ (q1 +
q2)yi + Ui + ru
rp0
i [θ
p0(αJ (i) , 1, · · · , 1)]− r2p0 , see inequality (3).
Early deviations from the main path are therefore deterred by inequality (10).
15Indeed there is no loss of generality to consider that q1 and q2 are multiple of k.
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3) No late deviation is profitable.
If from an ongoing phase (P0 or P(i)) a player let’s say j ∈ Nh deviates late, she receives
at most
1. (q1 + q2)ρ till the beginning of the phase EG;
2. ru
rp0
j [θ
p0(−1, · · · ,−1)] in the phase EG.
If player j does not deviates, she receives at least
1. −(q1 + q2)ρ till the beginning of the phase EG;
2. ru
rp0
i [θ
p0(α)] in the phase EG, where α ∈ {0.1}n.
As ru
rp0
i [θ
p0(α)] is grater than or equal to ru
rp0
i [θ
p0(−1, · · · ,−1)] + rφ (see inequality
(2)), and −2(q1 +q2)ρ+rφ > 0, no late deviation is profitable. This concludes the proof.
7 Appendix 2: Proof of the complete Nash folk the-
orem
7.1 On the existence of the limit set of the set of pure strat-
egy Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated
game
In this section, I show that the limit set of the set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium
payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game is well defined. Namely, I show that for
any compact stage-game, this limit set equals the set of feasible payoff vectors that are
approachable by means of pure strategy Nash equilibria of the finitely repeated game
(see Definition 5). I proceed with lemmata. These lemmata as well as their proofs are
very similar to those used in Section 6.1.
Let G be a compact normal form game and let ANE(G) be the set of feasible payoff
vectors that are approachable by means of pure strategy Nash equilibria of the finitely
repeated game. For any T > 0, let NE(T ) be the set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium
payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game G(T ). Let NE be the Hausdorff limit of the
set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game.
Lemma 11 The set ANE(G) is a compact and convex set.
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Proof of Lemma 11. It is immediate that ANE(G) is a closed subset of the set
of feasible payoff vectors of the stage-game G. As the set of feasible payoff vectors is
compact, the set ANE(G) is also compact. The convexity of the set ANE(G) follows
from the fact that the conjunction of two pure strategy Nash equilibrium play paths
remains a pure Nash equilibrium play path.
Lemma 12 For all T > 0, NE(T ) ⊆ ANE(G).
Proof of Lemma 12. Let σ be a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the finitely
repeated game G(T ) and pi(σ) = (pi1(σ), · · · , piT (σ)) be the play path generated by σ.
Let x = uT (σ). For all s ≥ 0 and t ∈ {2, . . . , T}, the play path
pi(s, t) = (pit(σ), · · · , piT (σ), pi(σ), · · · , pi(σ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
s times
)
is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium play path of the finitely repeated game G((s+1)T −
t+ 1) and the sequence
(
u(s+1)T−t+1[pi(s, l)]
)
s≥0 converges to x.
Lemma 13 As the time horizon increases, the set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium
payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game converges to the set ANE(G).
The proof of this lemma is similar to the one of Lemma 5 and therefore omitted.
7.2 On the Nash feasibility of pure strategy Nash equilibrium
payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game
Lemma 14 For any T > 0 and any pure strategy Nash equilibrium σ of the finitely re-
peated game G(T ), the support {pi1(σ), · · · , piT (σ)} of the play path pi(σ) = (pi1(σ), · · · , piT (σ))
generated by σ is included in the set Nash(G∗h) of pure Nash equilibria of the one shot
game G∗h.
Proof of Lemma 14. I proceed by induction on the time horizon T . For T = 1, σ is
a pure Nash equilibrium of the stage-game G. As the sequence of sets (Nash(G∗l))l≥0 is
increasing, we have Nash(G) = Nash(G∗0) ⊆ Nash(G∗h) and the support {pi1(σ)} of the
play path pi(σ) is included in Nash(G∗h) .
Assume that T > 1 and that the support of the play path generated by any pure
strategy Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated game G(t) with 0 < t < T is included
in Nash(G∗h) and let’s show that {pi1(σ), · · · , piT (σ)} ⊆ Nash(G∗h).
The restriction σ|pi1(σ) of the strategy profile σ to the history pi1(σ) is a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated game G(T − 1) and by induction hypothesis,
the support {pi2(σ), · · · , piT (σ)} of σ|pi1(σ) is included in the set Nash(G∗h). It remains to
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prove that pi1(σ) ∈ Nash(G∗h). Suppose that pi1(σ) /∈ Nash(G∗h). Then there exists a
player i ∈ N who has an incentive to deviate from the pure action profile pi1(σ) in the
game G∗h. Player i has to be a member of the block N\N∗h since each player of the block
N∗h has a constant utility function in the game G
∗h.
Let σ′i be the pure strategy of player i in the finitely repeated game G(T ) in which player
i plays a stage-game pure best response at each round of the finitely repeated game.
There is no lost if we assume that σ is the grim trigger strategy profile associated to the
path pi(σ).16
At the pure strategy profile (σ′i, σ−i), player i receives the sequence of stage-game payoffs
{ui(pi1(σ)) + e, n∗i , · · · , n∗i }
whereas at σ she receives
{ui(pi1(σ)), n∗i , · · · , n∗i }
where e > 0 and n∗i is her unique pure Nash equilibrium payoff in the stage-game G. This
implies that uT (σ′i, σ−i) > u
T (σ). The pure strategy σ′i is therefore a profitable deviation
of player i from σ. This contradicts the fact that σ is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
of the finitely repeated game G(T ). It follows that pi1(σ) ∈ Nash(G∗h), which concludes
the proof.
From Lemma 14, it follows that only the payoff vectors of the convex hull F of the
set u(Nash(G∗h)) = {u(a) | a ∈ Nash(G∗h)} can be sustainable by pure strategy Nash
equilibria of the finitely repeated game. We have the following corollary.
Corollary 2 For any T > 0 and for all pure strategy Nash equilibrium σ of the finitely
repeated game G(T ), the average payoff vector uT (σ) belongs to the set F of Nash-feasible
payoff vectors of the stage-game G.
7.3 Proof of Theorem 2
From Corollary 2, any pure strategy Nash equilibrium payoff vector of any finite repeti-
tion of the stage-game has to be Nash-feasible. Denoting by I the set of payoff vectors
that dominate the minimax payoff vector µ, we have that NE(T ) ⊆ F ∩ I for all T ≥ 1.
16The grim trigger strategy profile associated to a path pi ∈ AT is a strategy profile σpi of the finitely
repeated game G(T ) in which players follow the path pi until a unique player deviates. After a unilateral
deviation has been observed, the grim trigger strategy profile prescribes to punish the deviator by
pushing her down to her minimax payoff till the end of the game. It is straightforward to see that
a path is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium play path of the finitely repeated game if and only if the
grim trigger strategy profile associated to that path is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of that finitely
repeated game.
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Lemma 16 says that any payoff vector x ∈ F ∩ I is approachable by means of pure
strategy Nash equilibria of the finitely repeated game. This lemma concludes the proofs
of both Theorem 2 and Theorem 4 as the limit set NE equals the set ANE(G) of payoff
vectors that are approachable by means of pure strategy Nash equilibria of the finitely
repeated game; see Lemma 13. I first construct an appropriate end-game strategy.
Similarly to the case of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium solution,
the sequence of subsets (N∗l )l≥0 defined in Section 4.1 induces a separation of the set
of players into two blocks N∗h and N\N∗h . As a corollary of Lemma 14, each player of
the block N\N∗h (if any) receives her unique stage-game pure Nash equilibrium payoff at
each pure strategy Nash equilibrium of any finite repetition of the stage-game G.17 The
next lemma says that there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of a finite repetition
of the stage-game G where each player of the block N∗h receives an average payoff that
is strictly greater than her pure minimax payoff.
Lemma 15 Let G be a compact normal form game and
∅ = N∗0  N∗1  · · ·  N∗h its decomposition.18 Then there exists T0 > 0 and a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium of the repeated game G(T0) at which each player of the block
N∗h receives an average payoff that is strictly greater than her stage-game pure minimax
payoff.
Proof of Lemma 15. I will prove the following property by induction on g: for all
g ≤ h and all i ∈ N∗g , there exists Ti,g > 0 and a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the
repeated game G(Ti,g) at which player i receives an average payoff that is strictly greater
than her stage-game pure minimax payoff.
For g = 1, take Ti,g = 1 for each i ∈ N∗1 .
Fix g ∈ {1, · · · , h−1} and assume that the property holds for g. Pose N∗g = {j1, · · · , jm}.
For all j ∈ N∗g , let Tj,g > 0 and let pij be a play path generated by a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated game G(Tj,g) at which player j receives an
average payoff that is strictly greater than her stage-game pure minimax payoff. Let
piN
∗
g = (pij1 , · · · , pijm). The trigger strategy associated to piN∗g is a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium of the repeated game G(
∑
j∈N∗g Tj,g) and the average payoff of each player
of the block N∗g at that Nash equilibrium is strictly greater than her stage-game pure
minimax payoff.19
Let i ∈ N∗g+1\N∗g and let yi,g be the best pure Nash equilibrium profile of player i in the
17Indeed, at any profile of action a ∈ Nash(G∗h), each player of the block N∗h receives her unique
stage-game pure Nash equilibrium payoff vector. This payoff equals her stage-game pure minimax payoff.
18See Section 4.1 for the definition of the sequence (N∗l )l≥0.
19Note that each player of the block N\N∗g plays a stage-game pure best response at any profile of
actions of the path piN
∗
g .
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one shot game G∗g. There exists k > 0 such that the trigger strategy associated to the
path
(yi,g, piN
∗
g , · · · , piN∗g︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
)
is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the repeated game G(1 + k ·∑j∈N∗g Tj,g). At the
later Nash equilibrium, player i receives an average payoff that is strictly greater than
her stage-game pure minimax payoff. Take Ti,g+1 = 1 + k ·
∑
j∈N∗g Tj,g. This concludes
the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 16 Let G be a compact normal form game. Any Nash-feasible and individually
rational payoff vector is approachable by means of pure strategy Nash equilibria of the
finitely repeated game.
Proof of Lemma 16. Let x be a Nash-feasible and individually rational payoff vec-
tor and ε > 0. I wish to construct a time horizon Tε,x such that for all T ≥ Tε,x,
the finitely repeated game G(T ) has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium σε,x,T satisfying
d(x, uT (σε,x,T )) < ε.
Let x′ ∈ F ∩ I such that
d (x, x′) ≤ ε
8
and x′i > µi for all i ∈ N∗h .20
Since Q is dense in R, there exists a sequence (γt)1≤t≤p of strictly positive rationals
numbers and a sequence (at)1≤t≤p of elements of Nash(G∗h) such that
d (x′,
∑p
t=1 γtu(a
t)) < ε
′
8
and
∑p
t=1 γt = 1 where
ε′ = min{ ε
2
,mini∈N∗h(x
′
i − µi)}
is strictly positive. Let x′′ =
∑p
t=1 γtu(a
t). We have ui(a
t) = µi for all t, 1 ≤ t ≤ p and
i /∈ N∗h . Thus, x′′i = µi for all i /∈ N∗h . We also have x′′i > µi for all i ∈ N∗h . This holds
since d(x′, x′′) < x′i−µi for all i ∈ N∗h . Consider a sequence of natural numbers (qt)1≤t≤p
such that for all t, t′ ∈ {1, ..., p} we have γt
γt′
= qt
qt′
. Let q =
∑p
t=1 qt and
pi = (a1, a1, · · · , a1︸ ︷︷ ︸
q1 times
, · · · , ap, ap, · · · , ap︸ ︷︷ ︸
qp times
).
20One could take x′ = x + ε8·d(x,y) (y − x) where y is the average payoff vector to the pure Nash
equilibrium given by Lemma 15.
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Let pih be a play path generated by a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the repeated
game G(T0) at which each player of the block N
∗
h receives an average payoff that is
strictly greater than her stage-game pure minimax payoff, see Lemma 15. There exists
k > 0 such that the trigger strategy associated to the path
pi(q) = (pi, pih, · · · , pih︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
)
is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the repeated game G(q+ kT0). Let pi(s, q) be the
play path defined by
pi(s, q) = (pi, · · · , pi︸ ︷︷ ︸
s times
, pi(q)).
The grim trigger strategy profile σpi(s,q) associated to pi(s, q) is a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium of the finitely repeated game G(u(s+1)q+kT0). As s increases, the payoff
vector u(s+1)q+kT0(σpi(s,q)) converges to x′′. Therefore, there exists sε,x > 0 such that for
all s ≥ sε,x, d(x′, u(s+1)q+kT0(σpi(s,q))) < ε8 . Choose sε,x large enough such that ρs < ε8 for
all s > sε,x and take Tε,x = (sε,x + 1)q + kT0.
8 Appendix 3: In case there exists a discount factor
If there exists a discount factor, then one only has to adjust the proofs of Lemmata 10
and 16. In the proof of Lemma 10, one can apply Lemma 1 to y and obtain piy and
thereafter use the discounted version of Lemma 9, see Lemma 17 below. To adjust the
proof of Lemma 16, one can apply Lemma 1 to ε = ε
′
8
and obtain a deterministic path
pi whose discounted average is within ε of x′.
Lemma 17 Let ∅ = N0  N1  ...  Nh be the Nash decomposition of the stage-game
G. Then there exists φ > 0 such that for all p ≥ 0 there exists rp > 0, δp ∈ (0, 1) and
θp : {0, 1}n ∪ {(−1, · · · ,−1)} → Arp := A× · · · × A
such that for all α ∈ {0, 1}n ∪ {(−1, · · · ,−1)} and δ ∈ (δp, 1), θp(α) is a play path
generated by a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the repeated game with
discounting G(δ, rp).
21 Furthermore, for all i ∈ Nh and α, α′ ∈ {0, 1}n and δ ∈ (δp, 1),
we have
u
rp,δ
i [θ
p(1, α−i)]− urp,δi [θp(0, α−i)] ≥ φ, (12)
21I recall that in the discounted repeated game G(δ, rp), the utility of player i at the play path θ
p(α)
is u
rp,δ
i [θ
p(α)] = 1−δ1−δrp
∑rp
t=1 δ
t−1ui(θ
p
t (α)), where θ
p
t (α) is the t th profile of action of θ
p(α).
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u
rp,δ
i [θ
p(α)]− urp,δi [θp(−1, · · · ,−1)] ≥ φ (13)
and
|urp,δi [θp(α)]− urp,δi [θp(αJ (i) , α′N\J (i))]| <
1
2p
. (14)
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